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What do indices of disproportionality actually measure? They  provide an aggregate estimation of the difference between votes cast 
and seats assignment, but  the relation between the value of the indices and the will of the voters is highly questionable. The reason is 
that when casting the vote the voter is deeply affected by the electoral system itself, possibly more deeply than s/he understands. The 
aim of this paper is to assess the performance of the most used indices of disproportionality with respect to the will of voters. To do 
so we compare by simulation their performance in some major electoral systems and with reference to some stylised typical cases. 
We use as a benchmark  a "true" index, i.e. an index that measures the difference between the will of the voters (instead of the votes) 
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1. Introduction. 
In his fundamental work of 1999, Lijphart discusses at large the disproportionality of electoral 
systems.
1 His table 7.2 ranks 36 democracies according to the disproportionality of their system, as 
measured by the index of Gallagher, G. Not surprisingly, the most proportional system is the 
Netherlands, where the system is proportionality with a nation-wide constituency. Possibly not so 
expected is that the least one is France, where runoff should improve the proportionality with 
respect to plurality countries. Actually, the votes considered in France are those of the runoff ballot: 
this makes France a First-past-the-post country as for the computing of G, but for many voters the 
votes are second-best ones. This introduces our topic. 
What do the index G and the other indices of disproportionality actually measure? The 
obvious answer is that they  provide an aggregate estimation of the difference between votes cast 
and seats assignment. In turn, this difference is supposed to be an estimate of the difference between 
what could be defined the "aggregate will" of the voters and the allocation of seats in the 
Parliament. It is this estimate that makes the index of interest. The distribution of votes is of interest 
because it is a proxy of the distribution of the preferences. If an index of disproportionality has a 
high value, the will of the voters is (supposed to be) poorly represented in the Parliament, while if 
its value is low the correspondence is (supposed to be) substantive. 
Actually, the relation between the value of the index and the will of the voters is highly 
questionable. The reason is that when casting the vote the voter is deeply affected by the electoral 
system itself, possibly more deeply than s/he understands, as we will see. First, many voters will not 
vote for their preferred party if it is unlikely that it will gain a seat; they will prefer to turn to their 
second (or further) preference, or to abstain. The votes cast by second- (third-, etc.) best voters and 
by first- best voters are computed in the same way in the index, but the computing conceals a 
difference in the representation of the will that may be very large. The problem is even more serious 
if a voter abstains, as her/his will is simply not represented in the index, which by necessity 
considers only valid votes. This may produce a perverse result, because the abstention is likely to be 
higher if voters do not find a suitable party: a high rate of abstention indicates that the will of the 
voters is poorly represented, but their exclusion may result in a relatively low level of the index. 
Second, the very supply of parties is affected by the electoral system. As famously expressed by the 
Law of Duverger, non-proportional systems are likely to have less parties than proportional ones. 
Hence the choice of a voter in a plurality system is likely to be more constrained even if the voter is 
ready to vote for a party which is unlikely to win. In other terms, the demand  of parties (or 
candidates) may be different, even very different, from its supply, and a voter may well be unaware 
                                                 
1 "Disproportionality occurs when political parties receive shares of legislative seats that are not equal to their shares of votes" 
(Monroe, 1994, p. 138).   3
of this difference. Her/his will may possibly be represented, but the will is forced to be a choice 
among a set of alternatives limited by the electoral rules. Possibly s/he does not even know that s/he 
could want more.  
The distortion induced by the strategic voting and by the strategic supply of parties in non-
proportional systems may be very high. Authoritatively, Cox (1997, p.97) claims that (in plurality 
systems) "if clear information about candidate chances is provided, one can expect substantial 
levels of strategic voting, and a consequent reduction in the number of viable candidacies". 
According to Alvarez et al. (2006), some 64% of the voters who could sensibly vote strategically 
actually did so in the British election of 1997. Also, data in the appendix show that in Western 
Europe more than 7% of the voters would have probably voted for a party located 1 or 10 on a ten-
point left-right scale, and more than 16% for a party located lower than 3 or higher than 8. These 
parties are likely to be non present, or non credible, in a plurality system.  
Both factors reduce the validity of the indices, and in an erratic way. We cannot know whether a 
voter voted for the Partial Freedom Party because s/he likes it or because it despises it, but less than 
the Pure Freedom Party. Nor we can know whether the same voter would have preferred the No 
Freedom Party, had it been present in the poll. Not by chance, all indices perform particularly well 
in Soviet-type elections, where there is only one party and voting is close to compulsory. This is not 
a joke: the constraints imposed by Soviet electoral law to the choice of voters may be considered 
the limiting case of a range that spans from the nearly-no-constraint case of one-district, no-
threshold pure proportional system to plurality and beyond
2. In addition, these constraints are 
different across countries and systems. The usual indices of disproportionality may fail their major 
aim, that is to be a tool suitable to measure the difference between the will of the voters and the 
composition of the Parliament; but possibly they are even less reliable if they are used to compare 
across real cases the performance of electoral systems  with respect to the representation of the will 
of the voters. 
How unreliable are the indices? The aim of this paper is to assess the performance of the most 
used ones. To do so we will compare their performance in some major electoral systems and with 
reference to some typical cases with that of a "true" index, i.e. an index that measures the difference 
between the will of the voters (instead of the votes) and the assignment of seats.  Details on the 
methodology are in the next section; the results are discussed in the following one. Section four 
contains our conclusions
3. 
                                                 
2 To be true, the cost of taking part in a poll induces some constraints even in fully proportional systems, and these constraints may 
be different in different countries. However these constraints are arguably minor with respect to the ones imposed by non-
proportionality, and we will not consider them. 
3 We must emphasize that the correspondence to the will of voters will be defined on a purely empirical basis. For a different 
approach (the satisfaction of given theoretical requirements) see Nurmi, 2005, and the literature quoted therein.   4
2. Methodology.   
In  the literature it is possible to find at least 25 indices of disproportionality (see among 
others  Monroe, 1994; Taagepera and Grofman, 2003; Grilli di Cortona et al., 1999; Karpov 2008; 
Borooah, 2002). All of them are based on the difference between seats and votes, hence none of 
them is immune from the pitfalls described in the previous section. Possibly due to the 
unavailability of estimation tools (see below), the comparison of the indices has been typically 
performed according to their adherence to some consistency and implementability criteria defined a 
priori (see Pennisi, 1998; Taagepera and Grofman, 2003; Monroe, 1994; Karpov, 2008). As we 
wrote above, in this paper we will instead examine the performance of the indices considered 
through the comparison with a "true index". We will deal only with some most well-known and 
most employed indices; further papers may provide a more complete overview. The indices 
considered in this paper are
4: 
 
1. Gallagher (G), [(1/2)∑(vi-si)
2]
0.5 
2. Lijphart (L), (1/2)∑|vi-si| 
3. Loosemore and Hanby (LH),  (1/2)∑|vi-si| 
4. Rae (R), (1/n)∑|vi-si| 
 
where i refers to the parties, n is the number of parties, v is the share of votes and s the share of 
seats. The difference between LH and L is that L includes only the two majors parties. There has 
been some debate on how to treat minor parties in G (see Lijphart, 1994), but this problem is of no 
relevance for this paper. 
To get rid of the constraints imposed by the electoral system (see above), we will consider 
different systems applied to the same set of preferences of the voters. In other terms, we will 
determine the assignment of seats produced by different electoral systems in a given case, and we 
will compare this assignment not with the votes cast, but with the first preferences of the voters. To 
do so we will consider the votes cast in a pure-proportional ballot with a nation-wide district as a 
proxy of the true preference of the voters. The ensuing assignment of seats provides the basis for the 
computing of the "true" index of disproportionality. The index is simply 
 
di = S'i/S   
 
                                                 
4 See Gallagher, 1991; Loosemore and Hanby, 1971; Lijphart, 1994; Rae, 1967.   5
where S is the total number of seats (the same for all electoral systems considered) and S'i is the 
number of seats allocated by electoral system i differently from the allocation in the pure 




where S'j is the number of seats obtained by party j in that system, Sj is the number of seats obtained 
by party j in the pure proportional, one district ballot and S is the total of seats
5.  
To apply different electoral systems to the same set of preferences we resorted to a powerful 
program of electoral simulation, ALEX4,  developed by M.E.Bissey at the University of Piemonte 
Orientale
6. The program requires as an input the number of seats, the share of first preferences of 
the voters for each party, the number of proportional districts and the number of voters per district; 
plus some parameters necessary to establish the full ordering of preferences, the geographical 
concentration of parties, and the propensity to strategic voting. Details on the inputs are in the 
appendix. The outputs of ALEX4 are the Parliaments as determined by 19 different electoral 
systems (majoritarian, proportional and parallel), the votes cast to each party in each electoral 
system, some indices of disproportionality (including index di above)
7 and some indices of 
governability and of power (not relevant for this paper). A complete description of the program is in 
Bissey and Ortona, 2007. We considered three highly hypothetical cases and a less-hypothetical 
one, labelled Virtual Italy, Virtual Netherlands, Virtual Europe and Real Italy; and five electoral 
systems, i.e. one-district pure proportionality, threshold proportionality, Condorcet, Runoff 
majority, and Plurality, the last one both with and without strategic voting
8. The three virtual cases 
have been obtained from the answers to question E033 of the European Value Survey of 2004, "In 
political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this 
scale, generally speaking?". Each point of the ten-point left-right axis has been interpreted as a 
party
9. For the reasons explained in section 1, in non-proportional systems the convergence of 
parties towards the centres may have constrained the opinions of the responders, hence we assumed 
as cases for the study the two countries with a long-lasting tradition of proportional voting, Italy and 
Netherlands. To consider a different case we added the summary results of Western Europe
10; basic 
data are again in the appendix.  
                                                 
5 Note that rounding may produce a small deviation from 0 even in a pure-proportional, one-district system. 
6 We used version 4.1.4. 
7 Actually the indices provided are indices of proportionality; the output provided is 1-di. 
8 See the appendix for details. 
9 The Real Italy case is described in appendix. 
10 As results from the data in the appendix, the answers in the last case are actually more concentrated towards the centre, mostly on 
party 5. This supports the hypothesis of a bias in non-proporrtional countries.   6
3. Results.   
Tables 1 to 4 present the percent results of the simulations for the four cases considered. In 
column 2 there is the "true" index (see above), labelled T, and in the following ones the computed 
indices and (in black) the difference between T and the index of the column, both rounded to one 
decimal.  
 
Table 1 - Results for the Virtual Netherlands 










Table 2 - Results for Virtual Italy 









Table 3 - Results for Virtual Western Europe  











Table 4 - Results for "Real" Italy 








                                  Index→ 
System↓ 
  T   G     L  LH    R 
Condorcet  57 60.6  - 3.6 32.9    24.2  56.9    0.1  11.4   45.6
Plurality  53 38.4   14.6 27.9    25.1 50.3    2.7  10.1   42.9
Plurality with strategic voting  56 43.1   12.9 30.1    25.9 55.9    0.1  11.2   44.8
Runoff majority  54 41.2   12.8 31.8    22.2 54.4    0.6  10.7   43.3
Pure proportionality    2 1.3       0.7 0.6        1.4 2.6     -0.6  0.5       1.5
Threshold proportionality    7 4.2       2.7 1.6        5.4 7.6     -0.6  1.5       5.5
                                 Index→ 
System↓ 
  T   G     L  LH    R 
Condorcet  62 46.6   15.4 31.9   30.1 61.8   0.2  12.4   49.6
Plurality  64 48.0   16.0 33.9   30.1 63.9   0.1  12.8   51.2
Plurality with strategic voting 61 45.6   15.4 32.4   15.4 60.8   0.2  12.2   48.8
Runoff majority  68 50.9   17.1 38.4   29.6 67.8   0.2  13.6   54.4
Pure proportionality    1 0.9       0.1 0.4       0.6 1.5   -0.5  0.3       0.7
Threshold proportionality    8 5.3       2.7 2.4       5.6 9.0   -1.0  1.8       6.2
                                  Index→ 
System↓ 
  T   G     L  LH    R 
Condorcet  67 50.3    16.7 89.7   -22.7 66.6    0.4  12.3   53.7
Plurality  69 73.4     -4.4 41.7    27.3 68.6    0.4  13.7   55.3
Plurality with strategic voting  68 72.2      4.2 40.7    27.2 67.6    0.4  13.5   54.5
Runoff majority  66 70.0     -4.0 39.2    26.8 65.6    0.4  13.1   52.9
Pure proportionality    2 1.4        0.6 0.8        1.2 2.2     -0.2  0.4       1.6
Threshold proportionality  14 6.7        7.3 3.8      10.2 13.4    0.6  2.7     11.3
Index→ 
System↓ 
  T   G     L  LH    R 
Condorcet  37  26.4    10.6 18.4    18.6 36.8    0.2  8.2      28.8
Plurality  49  37.2    11.8 30.3    18.7 48.9    0.1  10.9    38.1
Plurality with strategic voting  34  19.8    14.2 17.1    16.9 34.2    0.2  7.6      26.4
Runoff majority  36  22.4    13.6 17.8    18.2 35.7    0.3  7.9      28.1
Pure proportionality  0.5 0.3        0.2 0.2        0.3 0.5      0.0  0.1        0.4
Threshold proportionality  13  7.0        6.0 4.6        8.4 13.5    0.5  3.0      10.0  7
 
     These results suggest two relevant considerations (a and b below) and some less relevant ones. 
a) The index LH performs remarkably well. Why LH performs better than the other indices is 
apparently easy to explain. As may be expected, and as results from our data, all the indices tend to 
underevaluate disproportionality (there are only seven minus signs in ninety-six figures, five of 
which in proportional systems). LH compensates for such underevaluation better than the other 
indices. It adds more terms than L (in our experiment, ten or nine instead of two), and it divides the 
resulting sum by a figure lower than in R (in our case, two instead of ten or nine). Finally, the figure 
for LH is generally higher, often largely higher, than that of G, which can again explain its better 
performance as a result of a better compensation for the underevaluation implicit in the index.  
However, two points are intriguing. First, there are some cases in tables 1 and 3 where G is 
higher than LH, and in these cases too LH performs better. Second, and more relevant, LH not only 
performs better than the other indices; it also performs very well. Its largest difference from the 
"true" index is under plurality in table 1, with an absolute difference of only 2.7 and a relative 
difference as small as 5%. Clearly, further inquiry is requested, both experimental/simulative and 
theoretical.  
b) The other indices perform poorly in most cases. The second best performing index, G, 
obtains relatively good figures (an absolute difference lower that 10) only in proportional systems, 
as obvious, and in four other cases out of 16. Three are in virtual Western Europe; the most relevant 
difference of this setting with respect to the others is the presence of a large centrist party, which 
attracts both  votes and seats. This suggests that G may provide good results in cases where few 
parties get votes; possibly deceitfully, if the choices of the voters are constrained -see the discussion 
in section 1. The performance of R is particularly poor; its underevaluation of the disproportionality 
is clearly due (in our case) to the high value of the denominator. This suggests that it can provide 
better results if there are less parties; again, these results may easily be deceitful due to what in 
section 1
11.  
c) The hierarchy of the indices is clear, LH>G>L>R; this order is respected in all cases, bar an 
equal value of G and L and a better results of G, both in table 3 (the last one, however, in a 
proportional system, where all the indices perform reasonably well, as expected). This goes against 
a general feeling in the literature that G is the most reliable index. 
d) The clusters of the results are generally respected, albeit the values are scaled down. 
However, some results are erratic: this is the case of G for Condorcet in tables 1 and 3, and of L 
again for Condorcet in table 3.  
                                                 
11 The correlation among all the indices is very high, due to the presence of two clusters of systems (proportional and non-
proportional). If we consider only non-proportional systems, T correlates highly with LH (r=0.9943) and R (r=0.9892);  less with G 
(r=0.875) and L (r=0.6506). All figures are significant at 0.01.   8
e) The correspondence between the order of the indices and that of T is quite sound; 
exceptions are L in tables 1 to 3, and G and R in table 3. Note however that the values of T in table 
3 are very close. This suggest that the traditional indices, bar L, may possibly be used  to compare 
different electoral systems across a given set of preferences, albeit with great caution. Further 
experiments should help.   9
4. Conclusions.  
Our experiment suggests that the three indices G, LH and R perform very poorly as indicators 
of the misallocation of the seats with respect to the preferences of the voters. They should be 
employed with great caution, and no inference about the correspondence of seats and preferences 
should be drawn from that of seats and votes. LH makes a noticeable (and unexpected) exception; 
however, the reasons of its good performance in our experiment are unclear. Further analysis is 
strongly recommended. The opinion that G is the better index is not confirmed with reference to the 
distribution of the preferences of the voters. Finally, the indices, bar L, appear to be not too 
unreliable as a tool to compare ordinally electoral systems across a given case, arguably provided 
that the difference in the allocation of seats among the systems is not too small.  
However, we must emphasize that our experiment is very preliminary. Further research should 
include a more complete plan of experiments, to consider a more general panoply of cases relevant 
both from the theoretical and the empirical point of view; and  a comparative static analysis of the 
indices with respect to some basic features, like the propensity to strategic voting, the number of 
parties, the district magnitude, and so on. Advanced simulation programs like ALEX4 should allow 
to tackle both tasks.   10
Appendix. Input data. 
 
a) "Virtual" cases. Percent shares of first preferences. 
 








1 5.22  1.87  3.83 
2 5.03  4.47  3.73 
3 10.06  13.91  10.31 
4 11.52  16.30  11.28 
5 23.17  23.05  30.42 
6 17.06  16.72  15.92 
7 10.69  16.51  10.72 
8 8.47  5.92  7.93 
9 4.33  0.83  2.62 




b) Details about the "Real Italy" case. 
 
We employed the data used in Ottone et al. (2007), that refer to the election of the Camera dei 
Deputati in 2006. There are 9 parties, with the distribution of first preferences that follows: 
 
 
Party  (1, most  
leftist) 













c) Details about the simulations.  
We supposed 100 (630, as this is the number of seats in the Italian Camera dei Deputati, in 
the “Real Italy”) uninominal districts, each with 100 voters. The resulting 10,000 (63,000) voters 
were collected in one overall district for proportional systems. The threshold of the threshold 
proportionality is 5%. Two parties take part in the second ballot of runoff majority. For plurality 
with strategic voting we assumed that in each district every voter votes for the biggest party of the 
coalition her/his preferred party belongs to. In the virtual cases, we assumed the presence of four   11
coalitions (1 party – 4 parties – 4 parties – 1 party from the left to the right). In the "real" scenario 
we assumed the presence of two coalitions (5 parties – 4 parties from the left to the right)
12. The 
complete order of preferences for Condorcet voting has been generated by ALEX4. The procedure 
is the following. Each virtual voter chooses as the second preferred party an adjacent party with 
probability p1, a second-to adjacent party with probability p2, and another party at random with 
probability 1-p1-p2. The procedure is iterated until the full order of preferences is generated. P1 was 
arbitrarily established at 0.5, and p2 at 0.1. 
 
 
                                                 
12 For other details about this simulation see Ottone et al, (2007).   12
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